Human Dignity as a Normative Standard or as a Value in Global Health Care Decisionmaking by Smith, George P., II
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
Human Dignity as a Normative Standard or as a Value in Global 
Health Care Decisionmaking 
George P. Smith II 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
George P. Smith II, Human Dignity as a Normative Standard or as a Value in Global Health Care 
Decisionmaking, 42 N.C. J. INT’L L. 275 (2017). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
 
Human Dignity as a Normative Standard or as a 
Value in Global Health Care Decisionmaking? 
George P. Smith, II† 
 
I. Introduction and Overview: Definitional and Structural 
Challenges to Human Dignity ................................... 276 
II. Human Dignity: Its Religious, Ethical, and Legal 
Provenance ................................................................. 280 
A. Contemporary Imprecisions and Penumbric 
Haze .................................................................... 283 
B. International Law Sources .................................. 285 
III. Transnational Standards of Equity: A Template for 
Decisionmaking? ....................................................... 286 
IV. Domestic or National Precedents .................................. 288 
A. Legislative Responses ......................................... 292 
V. Fundamental or Competing Human Rights? .................. 293 
A. Human Rights and the Rights of Man ................ 294 
B. Subsidiarity and The Law of International Human 
Rights .................................................................. 297 
C.   Advancing a Global Framework for a New 
Constitutionalism? .............................................. 298 
VI. Conclusion ..................................................................... 301 
 
 
† Professor Emeritus of Law, The Catholic University of America.  Visiting Fellow, 
Institute for Advanced Study, Indiana University. 
My research of the topic of this Article began in Summer 2013, when I was a Visiting 
Fellow at The Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law at Cambridge University 
and continued at The Hesburgh Center for Civil and Human Rights at the Notre Dame 
University Law School where I was a Visiting Scholar. To then-Professor James R. 
Crawford, Director Emeritus of The Lauterpacht Centre, and presently a judge on The 
International Court of Justice in The Netherlands, and to Professor Nell Jessup Newton, 
Dean of The Notre Dame Law School, I express my heartfelt gratitude for their friendship 
over the years and for their support of my Summer research affiliations. 
In June-July, 2014, I was a Visiting Scholar at The Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law 
Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics at Harvard Law School. During this time, I completed 
the research and the writing of a major draft of this Article. To Professor I. Glenn Cohen, 
the Director of the Center, I express my enduring appreciation to him and his colleagues 
for their generous support of my work. 
276 N.C. J. INT'L L.  [Vol. XLII 
 
I. Introduction and Overview: Definitional and Structural 
Challenges to Human Dignity 
“Human dignity—an international human right to well-being, to 
respect and deference, simply because we are human—seems 
wholly dependent upon our willing it to be so and our collective 
acceptance of some of the somber consequences in the exercise of 
that will.”1 
Acknowledged as a notion that neither exists in today’s society 
nor is a proper description of the world, human dignity is 
nonetheless accepted as possibly “the premier value underlying the 
last two centuries of moral and political thought.”2  The degree to 
which law accommodates dignity is evolving,3 as the precise means 
of human dignity can only be tested within the context of specific 
factual (e.g., situational) settings.4 
As a moral term, dignity suggests how individuals should or 
should not be treated individually or as a group within a given social 
and cultural grouping.5  Accordingly, no acceptable standard 
working definition of dignity is applicable uniformly.6  At a 
minimum, dignity means “respect for the intrinsic worth of every 
 
 1 Mary Ellen Caldwell, Well-Being: Its Place Among Human Rights, in TOWARD 
WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 169, 
196–97 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Westin eds., 1976). 
 2 Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 72 (2011) 
(quoting Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death 
Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 145, 
145 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992)). 
 3 See IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS FOR OUR TIMES (Robert P. Kraynak 
& Glenn Tinder eds. 2013); see also Glensy, supra note 2, at 88 n.117. 
 4 Glensy, supra note 2, at 67; Richard John Neuhas, Human Dignity and Public 
Disclosure, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 215, 216 (2008) [hereinafter HUMAN DIGNITY AND 
BIOETHICS] (discussing how the perennial clash over the issue of whether there is a 
difference between ethics and morality often finds common understanding in accepting the 
assertion that the former tests the rightness or wrongness of conduct while morality deals 
with the degree of evil accompanying conduct and discussing that, for bioethical decision 
making, the goal is “to do the right thing,” or—in other words—the “moral thing” and to 
this end, then, conduct which “directs one’s will in accord with the human good” is the 
situational goal to be achieved in issues of human dignity).  
 5 FIONA RANDALL & ROBIN DOWNIE, END OF LIFE CHOICES: CONSENSUS AND 
CONTROVERSY 178 (2010). 
 6 Id. at 179. 
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person.”7 
Grounded in the concept of autonomy by Kant, acknowledged 
as the father of the concept itself, dignity was cast as a normative 
legal ideal.8  Nations have either chosen to relate human dignity to 
the status of a foundational right supporting all other rights, or 
alternatively paired it with rights to equality and of liberty.9  Within 
the second paragraph of the Preamble of the Charter of the United 
Nations, human dignity appears as an ideal that “the peoples of the 
United Nations” are “determined” to achieve—this, by 
“reaffirmation” of their “faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small.”10 
The noble and lofty ideal of dignity allows easy acceptance and 
affirmation, but being nearly devoid of a substantive context, the 
application of it as a normative standard is much akin to the test 
Justice Potter Stewart set in 1964 for determining something was 
obscene.11  Using a common sense subjective standard, Justice 
Stewart famously remarked that he knew obscenity when he saw 
it.12  Indeed, Oscar Schachter opined that while violations of human 
dignity were difficult to determine, they could nonetheless be 
assessed by using the epistemology of, “I know it when I see it even 
if I cannot tell you what it is.”13  Perhaps a similar common sense, 
 
 7 Glensy, supra note 2, at 73 (quoting Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a 
Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 849 (1983)); see generally DIGNITY, 
CHARACTER, AND SELF RESPECT (Robert S. Dillon ed. 1995). 
 8 Glensy, supra note 2, at 76; James Orbinski, Justice and Global Health, in 16 LAW 
AND GLOBAL HEALTH 11, 11 (Michael Freeman et al. eds., 2014) (discussing Kant’s notion 
of “humanity in dignity,” which belies the very basis of all conceptions of human rights, 
does not however hold true—ipso facto—in practice “that all human beings have certain 
rights simply by virtue of being humans” and the possibility of this normative ideal 
becoming a practical norm depends upon legal “formulation and prescription.”); see Joel 
Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Human Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252-3 (1970). 
 9 See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BIOMEDICINE (2000); Glensy, supra 
note 2, at 69; see also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity 
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004). 
 10 Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially 
Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOWARD L.J. 145, 151 (1984); U.N. Charter 
pmbl., ¶ 1. 
 11 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 185, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring). 
 12 See id. 
 13 Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L. L. 848, 
849 (1983). 
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intuitive approach or even a consensus morality14 to assessing 
dignity—and practices of indignity—could be used in evaluating 
cases of misconduct in managing end-of-life care. 
In an effort to quantify conduct which degrades human dignity, 
various lists have been compiled of conduct and ideas that are 
“implicitly incompatible with the basic ideas of the inherent dignity 
and worth of human persons.”15  Among some twelve levels of 
conduct which challenge the notion of dignity are: “degrading living 
conditions and deprivation of basic needs;” “statements that demean 
and humiliate individuals or groups because of their origins, status 
or belief;” and “medical treatment or hospital care insensitive to 
individual choice or the requirements of human personality.”16  
Central to the very ideal of human dignity, then, are modes of 
conduct and ideas antithetical or incompatible with respect for basic 
or inherent dignity.17 
It is within the very issue of death management that human 
dignity is tested—both as to parameters of personal dignity and to 
basic dignity.18  Indeed, within end-of-life care, dignity can be seen 
 
 14 David N. Weisstub, Honor, Dignity, and The Framing of Multiculturalist Values, 
in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 263, 274 (David 
Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY]. 
 15 Schachter, supra note 13, at 852; Michael Stein, We All Want Our Doctors to Be 




(discussing how kindness in healthcare settings is seen as affecting patient outcomes and 
levels of satisfaction, it is now being “taught” in today’s medical schools and the closest 
medical researchers have come to promoting kindness as a basic health value is found in 
and through acts of empathy and  although still unclear what the result of a “lack of a linear 
response to empathy” may be manifested, there is recognition that “kindness carries with 
it a commitment to a certain way of thinking and being rather than to a particular pre-
defined endpoint.”). 
 16 Schachter, supra note 13, at 852–53; see Nick Bostrom, Dignity and Enhancement, 
in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 201–02 (2008) (citing Aurel Kolnai, 
Dignity, 51 PHIL. 251, 263 (1976)). 
 17 See Bostrom, supra note 16, at 201–02; Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The 
Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 
410 (discussing that although recognizing various types of dignity, it has been suggested, 
nevertheless, that there is a commonality among all notions of dignity—namely, the use 
of this word to reference “a property or properties’ . . . ‘that cause one to excel, and thus 
elicit or merit respect from other persons.”). 
 18 See Daniel P. Sulmasy, Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected 
Applications, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 474; Paul Ramsey, The 
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correctly as a human rights issue.19  In everyday conversation, 
dignity at death means: the avoidance of “being helpless, 
incontinent, incoherent, dependent, drooling, a burden to others and 
of poor general deportment.ˮ20 
A powerful interface exists between the right to human dignity 
and the right to life; for, “many of the claims to a right to die with 
dignity actually reaffirm a more general commitment to life 
(including life shared, love, and humanity) and to the ending of 
one’s life in dignity.”21  In this sense, “an affirmation of human 
dignity, its strength and grandeur, is an affirmation of the eternity 
of life.ˮ22  These fundamental human rights reflect, plainly, the 
interrelated right to a basic quality of life and, additionally, “in the 
rights to adequate food, health care, and shelter recognized in 
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration.ˮ23  Inasmuch as death is a 
 
Identity of Death with Dignity, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 47 (May, 1974).  See also 
Daniel P. Sulmasy, Death and Dignity, 61 LINACRE 27 (Winter 1994). 
 19 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 5, at 178. 
 20 Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay 
about Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 448 (1998); Emily 
B. Rubin et al., States Worse Than Death Among Hospitalized Patients With Serious 
Illness, 176 JAMA. INTERNAL MED. 1557, 1557 (Oct. 2016), 
http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/article-abstract/2540535 
[https://perma.cc/WT6J-3KKW]  (discussing how new research, drawn from 180 hospital 
patients over the age of 60, either approaching or under imminent peril of death regarding 
their attitudes toward functional debility, found certain conditions more unbearable than 
death itself, whose ranking in descending order were bowel and bladder incontinence; 
reliance on breathing machines in order to live; immobility and confinement to bed; 
confusion and the need for constant care; dependence on feeding intubation; living 
permanently in a nursing home; confinement to home living; consistent moderate pain; 
confinement to a wheelchair); see A GOOD DEATH? LAW AND ETHICS IN PRACTICE, (Lynn 
Hagger &  Simon Woods eds. 2013); see also ATUL GAWANDE, BEING MORTAL (2014) 
(forcefully arguing for greater acceptance of palliative care and hospice care as alternatives 
to seeking death with dignity by embracing assisted suicide or euthanasia).  
 21 Jordan J. Paust, The Human Right to Die with Dignity: A Policy-Oriented Essay, 
17 HUM. RTS. Q. 463, 480–81 (1995); see generally BRANDY SCHILLACE, DEATH’S 
SUMMER COAT: WHAT THE HISTORY OF DEATH AND DYING CAN TELL US ABOUT LIFE AND 
LIVING (2015) (discussing the way death is treated in modern society and the need for 
society to embrace dying in a manner akin to the treatment of living). 
 22 Paust, supra note 21, at 481. 
 23 Id.; see generally George P. Smith, II, Global Health Law: Aspirational, 
Paradoxical, or Oxymoronic?, in LAW AND GLOBAL HEALTH: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, 
452–64 (Michael Freeman et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the need for states to be “better 
equipped” in order to “work collectively toward accepting a shared level of responsibility 
for recognizing and providing heal commensurate with other fundamental civil, social, and 
political rights . . . .”). 
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part of life, “choice concerning life must necessarily include choice 
concerning the end and ending of life.ˮ24 
Included within the right to human dignity must be “a right to 
live with dignity, and thus a right to end one’s life in indignity—
indeed, a right not to be compelled to live the remainder of life in 
indignity.ˮ25  When remaining life has no quality and yields 
indignity, it is both humane and efficacious to respect “the dignity 
of personal choice.ˮ26 
Although no express right “to die with dignity” is to be found in 
definitive instruments on human rights,27 the very Charter of the 
United Nations addresses the need to protect and safeguard the 
essential “dignity and worth of the human person.ˮ28  “The inherent 
dignity . . . of all members of the human familyˮ is recognized in 
the preamble of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.29  The 
Declaration states further that not only are “[a]ll human beings . . . 
born free and equal in dignity and rights,ˮ but that each is entitled 
to have both respect and value, and a right to dignity.30  An 
interrelated right of privacy is, furthermore, recognized in Article 
12 of the Declaration.31  Even though phrased as a qualified right, it 
is nonetheless viewed correctly as extending in scope to include all 
personal choices such as those regarding death and dying.32 
II. Human Dignity: Its Religious, Ethical, and Legal 
Provenance 
Although not in the classical world regarded as inherent to all 
individuals, the notion of dignity or human worth was recognized in 
early history—but only for “virtuous persons.”33  Consequently, 
 
 24 Paust, supra note 21, at 481. 
 25 Id. at 480. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 476. 
 28 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ¶ 5 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 29 Id. ¶ 1. 
 30 Id. art. I. 
 31 Id. art. XII. 
 32 Paust, supra note 21, at 477. 
 33 C. Ben Mitchell, The Audacity of The Imago Dei, in IMAGO DEI: HUMAN DIGNITY 
IN ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE 79, 93 (Thomas A. Howard ed., 2013); see Courtney S. 
Campbell, Principlism and Religion: The Law and The Prophets, in A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLES?: FERMENT IN U.S. BIOETHICS 182 (Edwin R. DuBose et al. eds., 1994) 
(discussing how Imago Dei invokes characteristics such as “human creativity, the capacity 
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orphans, slaves, and those with physical defects were excluded 
altogether from qualifying for an ascription of being entitled to 
dignity.34 
The early views of the Jewish and the Christian faiths ascribed 
to the idea “that all human beings were created in the image [and 
likeness] of God.”35  This concept subsequently grew into the 
acceptance of the premise that the body and the soul were to be seen 
as integrated.36  This understanding of Imago Dei, or the image of 
God, in all of God’s creations, provided the foundation for the belief 
that there was an intrinsic value in each of those who bore his 
image.37 
Interestingly, the word, “‘dignity’ comes from the Latin dignitas 
(‘worth’) and dignus (‘worthy’).”38  “When applied to Homo 
sapiens, the etymology” implies that every individual must be 
acknowledged as imbued with an “inherent value” and, accordingly, 
be treated with “a special respect.”39 
Much of a contemporary understanding of human dignity can be 
attributed to religion and to ancient civilizations.40  Indeed, human 
rights—comparable to ones enumerated in modern international 
instruments—also have a clear provenance in history and biblical 
faith; for, within equality, concern for the poor and social justice are 
 
for relationships and community, and responsible compassionate stewardship for others”). 
 34 GARY B. FERNGREN, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY 95–96 
(2009).  
 35 See David Gelernter, The Irreducibly Religious Character of Human Dignity, in 
HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS 387.  See Yair Lorberbaum, Blood and The Image of God: 
On the Sanctity of Life in Biblical and Early Rabbinic Law, Myth, and Ritual, in CONCEPT 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 14, at 55 (discussing how Imago Dei was not the sole basis 
for developing the conceptual value of human dignity in Western Cultures—this, because 
Imago Dei was found originally in Mesopotamia and possibly in Ancient Egypt); see also 
Mitchell, supra note 33, at 94.  See generally Doron Shultziner, A Jewish Conception of 
Human Dignity, 34 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 663 (Dec. 2006) (discussing the meanings of 
human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah). 
 36 Mitchell, supra note 33, at 94–95. 
 37 Id. at 94; see John F. Crosby, The Twofold Sources of The Divinity of Persons, 18 
FAITH & PHIL. 292 (2001). 
 38 Mitchell, supra note 33, at 111. 
 39 Id.; IV OX ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656 (1989) (defining dignity as the quality of 
being worthy and honorable, worthiness, worth, nobleness, exclusive, the quality of being 
worthy of something). 
 40 STEPHEN JAMES, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 8 
(2007). 
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to be found the very seeds of human rights and the dignity of man.41 
Within the community of world religions, a consistently strong 
leadership role in securing the dignity of personhood can be claimed 
properly by the Roman Catholic faith.42  His Holiness Pope Benedict 
XVI, in remarks made on March 30, 2006, observed that today—as 
in the past—the principal focus of interventions by the Catholic 
Church have been to protect and to promote the dignity of the 
person, both from “moment of conception until natural death.”43 
Pope (now Saint) John Paul II, in his Apostolic Letter Salvifica 
Doloris, issued February 11, 1984, spoke eloquently of the 
essentiality of “every individual to ‘stop,’ as the Good Samaritan 
did, at the suffering of one’s neighbor, to have ‘compassion’ for that 
suffering and to give some help.”44  The Pope urged the cultivation 
of a “sensitivity of heart” which—in turn—“bears witness to 
compassion toward a suffering person,”45 and to an understanding 
that humans should be treated “as a psychological and physical 
‘whole’”46 
Previously in his encyclical, Pacem in Terris, issued in 1963, 
Pope John Paul XXIII declared: 
Man has the right to live. He has the right to bodily integrity and 
to the means necessary for the proper development of life . . . [H]e 
has the right to be looked after in the event of  
 
 41 Id. 
 42 See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLED DECISION-MAKING (David N. Weisstub ed., 
2006) (discussing the traditions and views of the Roman Catholic Church). 
 43 Junno Arocho Esteves, Holy Year is a Reminder to Put Mercy Before Judgment, 
Pope Says, CATHOLICNEWS.COM (Dec. 8, 2015 8:20 AM), 
http://www.catholicnews.com/services/englishnews/2015/holy-year-is-a-reminder-to-
put-mercy-before-judgment-pope-says.cfm [https://perma.cc/4TA8-NDNW].  See 
generally POPE FRANCIS’ YEAR OF MERCY: DECEMBER 8, 2015 – NOVEMBER 20, 2016, 
www.dynamiccatholic.com/year-of-mercy [https://perma.cc/H3DF-NFZ9] (discussing 
the year of mercy). 
 44 Salvific Doloris, Apostolic Lecture, On the Christian Meaning of Suffering 24 
(Feb. 11, 1984) [hereinafter On the Christian Meaning of Suffering].  See generally Laurie 
Goodstein & Elizabeth Povoledo, Amid Splits, Catholic Bishops Crank Open Door on 
Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2015, at A1 (quoting Gerard O’Connell) (discussing Pope 
Francis’ approach to a more merciful Catholic Church). 
 45 On the Christian Meaning of Suffering, supra note 44, at 3. 
 46 Id. at 22; see also George P. Smith, II, Cura Personalis: A Healthcare Delivery 
Quandary at The End of Life, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 311, 314 (2014). 
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illhealth . . . .47 
A. Contemporary Imprecisions and Penumbric Haze 
For some, the rise of human dignity as a normative value is seen 
as “awkward, clumsy, sloppy, instrumental, inflationary and open 
to judicial vagary,”48 as well as “ad hoc, erratic, ‘muddled and 
inconsistent.”49  Since dignity is incapable of being 
“operationalized,”50 it is argued that it cannot be recognized as a 
policy standard.  Indeed, in the United States, there has simply been 
“no coalescence . . . around the rational possibilities that exist for a 
coherent legal theory of human dignity.51  Thus, the legal ontology 
of dignity lies in obfuscation.52 
Yet, even with these negative arguments against the recognition 
and the application of dignity as a normative value, America has 
nonetheless chosen to base its socio-legal and ethical understanding 
of dignity on a libertarian tradition—this being contrary to some 
European countries that anchor dignity to notions of paternalism or 
communitarianism.53  Dignity is acknowledged as the United States 
Constitution’s fundamental value and the “cardinal principles for 
which the Constitution stands.”54 
Further, it has been asserted that dignity “cannot be demanded 
or claimed [because] . . . it cannot be provided and it is not owed.”55  
Rather, it “is to be expected or found in every living human being,” 
 
 47 Pacem in Terris: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing Universal Peace 
in Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty, HOLY SEE (Apr. 11, 1963), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html [https://perma.cc/U8PX-H4R3]. 
 48 Glensy, supra note 2, at 107 n.202. 
 49 Id. at 142 (citing R. James Fyle, Dignity as Theory: Competing Conceptions of 
Human Dignity at The Supreme Court of Canada, 70 SASK. L. REV. 1, 8, 13 (2007)). 
 50 David A. Hyman, Does Technology Spell Trouble with a Capital “T”: Human 
Dignity and Public Policy, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 17 (2003). 
 51 Glensy, supra note 2, at 108; see Ruth Macklin, Dignity is a Useless Concept, 327 
BRIT. MED. J. 1419 (2003) (holding that dignity could well be eliminated in medical ethics 
altogether and concluding that, in actuality, appeals to dignity are used to promote patient 
autonomy in end-of-life treatment decisions). 
 52 David N. Weisstub, Honor, Dignity, and The Framing of Multiculturalist Values, 
in CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 14, at 271 (David Kratzmer & Eckart Klein 
eds., 2002). 
 53 Glensy, supra note 2, at 108. 
 54 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1998); see Glensy, supra note 2, at 108. 
 55 LEON KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY 247 (2002). 
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since it is “aristocratic” in principle.56  Others have opined that 
dignity “is a mindset formed by others who observed our courage, 
honesty, and perseverance in the face of dignity.”57  The notion of a 
“right” to dignity for those holding this opinion is that there can be 
no right to dignity.58  It remains an open question “whether ‘dignity 
[is] an independent attribute of personhood” or an integral 
component of the very concept of personhood derived, as such, from 
autonomy, equality, or liberty.59 
While the United States Supreme Court has largely 
acknowledged the concept of dignity interests as a background 
norm, it has done so, in Eighth Amendment inquiries, as a primary 
force.60  In fact, when interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s 
imposition of affirmative obligations on the states, the Court often 
links liberty and dignity and thereby implies—if not states 
specifically—that from recognizing human dignity comes the 
imposition of a state duty to care for its citizens.61 
The phrase, “human dignity,” was first used in the United States 
Supreme Court by Justice Frank W. Murphy in a dissenting opinion 
in the case of In re Yamashita in 1946.62  Subsequently, the Court 
has employed this term or references the “dignity of man”63 in a 
considerable number of cases.64 
More contemporaneously, on June 26, 2015, writing for the 
majority in Obergefell et al., v. Hodges et al.,65 Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy repeatedly articulated the need to acknowledge and to 
embrace the realization that “certain personal choices [are] central 
to individual dignity and autonomy” and are inherent liberties 
 
 56 See id. at 246–47 (“One has no more right to dignity[—]and hence to dignity in 
death[—]than one has to beauty or courage or wisdom, desirable though these may be.”); 
see also id. at 247 (inferring that when the principle of dignity is democratized, however, 
“one can argue that ‘excellence,’ ‘being worthy’ is a property of all human beings.”). 
 57 ELIZABETH FOLEY, THE LAW OF LIFE AND DEATH 183 (2011). 
 58 KASS, supra note 55. 
 59 Glensy, supra note 2, at 127 n.282. 
 60 Id. at 123. 
 61 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976); see Glensy, supra note 2, at 88–
90. 
 62 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J. dissenting). 
 63 Paust, supra note 10, at 150 passim. 
 64 Id. at 153. 
 65 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
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protected by Due Process guarantees of the 14th Amendment.66  
While these expanded liberties are, as such, not enumerated within 
the Bill of Rights, they must nevertheless be accepted as within the 
“concept of individual autonomy.”67  When “a claim of dignity” 
conflicts “with both law and widespread social conventions,”68 as 
well as “substantial cultural and political developments,” the 
conflicts must be resolved in favor of safeguarding the dignity of 
personhood.69 
By way of analogy, Justice Kennedy’s positions in Obergefell,70 
clearly illustrate that the dignity of personhood is as important in its 
formation as it is in health care decision-making at the end-stage of 
life where personal autonomy and wellbeing, humanness, and 
compassion are vital components to assure a dignified death. 
B. International Law Sources 
The extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court utilizes 
international law norms in substantive constitutional interpretations 
has been a volatile issue of debate.71  While considered proper for 
the use of such norms for expository or empirical purposes, the fact 
that foreign or international bodies have adopted a particular rule as 
reason to constitutionalize and thereby afford substantive meaning 
 
 66 Id. at 2597. 
 67 Id. at 2621. 
 68 Id. at 2596. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See generally id. (discussing Justice Kennedy’s position on the dignity of 
personhood); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional 
Theory, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 111 (2015) (analyzing the role of precedent in Obergefell and 
Chief Justice Robert’s concern, in his dissent, of Justice Kennedy’s “recharacterization” 
of prior decisions by the Court). 
 71 See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES  (2015) (asserting U.S. laws should be harmonized with foreign treaties 
and laws). But see Note, Constitutional Courts and International Law: Revisiting the 
Transatlantic Divide, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (2016) (analyzing the supremacy of 
constitutional law over international law in Europe and the procedural difficulties 
incorporating international law into domestic law in America—concluding, as such, both 
transatlantic partners have developed mechanisms to prevent domestic law from being 
compromised by international law).  See generally Joan L. Larsen, Importing Control 
Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign 
and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 
(2004) (discussing the extent to which SCOTUS uses international law norms in 
substantive constitutional interpretations). 
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to the U.S. Constitution is thought to be without justification.72  This 
type of moral fact-finding has been soundly denounced by Justice 
Antonin Scalia as improper; this is simply because American law 
has different moral and legal frameworks.73 
Surely, however, there are universally shared common values 
such as human dignity, compassion, and humaneness which are 
important core values, or, even “norms” of conduct in some cases.  
These values form a part of the civilized conscience of mankind and 
should never be excluded from being vectors of force in judicial 
decision-making much as in the same way equity is ever present in 
all systems of both domestic and international law.74 
III. Transnational Standards of Equity: A Template for 
Decisionmaking? 
Equity is popularly understood as signifying “natural justice or 
whatever is right and just as between man and man . . . .”75  The 
antecedents of equity are acknowledged as “a system of 
jurisprudence which originated and developed outside the common 
law courts of England to supply to suitors remedial relief not 
obtainable in the common law courts.”76 
Although equity originally protected only property rather than 
personal or individual rights,77 the modern trend has been to extend 
 
 72 See Larsen, supra note 71, at 1287; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 
(2003) (referencing the holdings of the European Court of Human Rights); see also Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 73 Roper, 543 U.S. at 608, 622 passim (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Roger P. Alford, 
Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004).  
But see Ian M. Kysel, Domesticating Human Rights Norms in the United States: 
Considering the Role and Obligations of the Federal Government as Litigant, 46 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 1009 (2015); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims 
“Touch and Concern” the United States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1695 (2014); Penny M. Venetis, Enforcing Human Rights in the United States: Which 
Tribunals are Best Suited to Adjudicate Treaty-based Human Rights Claims?, 23 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 121 (2014).  
 74 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53–66 (3rd ed. 
1999) (discussing that perhaps human dignity and well-being could be advocated as being 
part of jus cogens—a fundamental or pre-empting norm of the violation of which 
invalidates rules consented to by states in treaties or accepted as customs); see also 
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 1–10 (2nd ed. 1956). 
 75 DE FUNIAK, supra note 74, at 1. 
 76 Id. at 2. 
 77 Id. at 10. 
2017 HUMAN DIGNITY AS A NORMATIVE STANDARD 287 
equitable relief to protect personal rights that are “existent and 
judicially cognizable to warrant the interposition of equity . . . .”78 
This especially includes the ever-strengthening rights of privacy.79  
Equally, equity has shown its outreach to protect civil rights.80  
Arguably, the “right” to protect well-being is within the zone of 
privacy and protectable as a civil right.  The inherent hope (and 
promise) of equity, then, is that it “corrects inequalities.”81 
Hugo Grotius, in his 1625 classic De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri 
Tres, or, The Law of War and Peace,82 found that Aristotle 
championed the notion that all treaties should be interpreted using 
principles of equity.83  In international law, equity is recognized as 
a “nonconsensual” source used either to supplement or modify the 
law’s conventional rules and customary usages.84  Early nineteenth 
and twentieth century arbitration treaties provided explicitly for the 
application of principles of equity to be applied in international law 
in interpreting treaties.85  Equity has always been seen as a form of 
judicial discretion86 as well as a form of distributive justice.87  In 
modern times, it has been especially inclusive of issues of maritime 
delimitations and The Law of the Sea.88 
The “universal law of society” is presumed to include customary 
 
 78 Id. at 125. 
 79 Id. at 129–34. 
 80 Id. at 140–43. 
 81 MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 127 
(1979). 
 82 See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (Francis W. 
Kelsey trans. 1925) (discussing how treaties should be interpreted using notions of equity). 
 83 See JANIS, supra note 74, at 74–75. 
 84 Id. at 54–55. 
 85 Id. at 52. 
 86 Id. at 69–70 (Janis recognizes three forms of equity: equity intra legem, praeter 
legem, and contra legem.  Equity intra legem (“within the law”) is applicable to “specific 
cases in such a way as to achieve the law’s intent, but without exceeding the law’s formal 
language.”  Equity praeter legem (“beyond the law”) is seen as a bold application by a 
judge to essentially “fill in gaps and supplement the law with equitable rules necessary to 
decide the case at hand.”  Lastly, equity contra legem (“against the law”) is “where the 
rules of the law are disregarded and the equitable result [is] achieved despite the law’s 
explicit injunction.”). 
 87 Id. at 75–79. 
 88 See id. at 212–24; see also KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON 
HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205–20 (1998). 
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law.89  As a result of this recognition, international lawyers are in 
general agreement that it is appropriate, and indeed proper, for 
outreach to be made beyond treaties and custom and to general 
principles of law, natural law, and to equity90  in order to find and to 
establish and protect the parameters of the bases of this universal 
law.91 
Interestingly, equitable principles, which form a part of the 
corpus of International Law, are seen as separate—in application—
from adjudicating cases ex aequo et bono (or, what is good and 
fair).92  Seen as a vital integrative force within International Law, 
equity is not restricted in its application and utilization as the 
principle of ex aequo et bono.  Specifically, under Article 38 of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, the power of the Court to 
use ex aequo et bono is granted to the court “if the parties agree 
thereto.”93  Even with these distinctions between equitable 
principles and the use of ex aequo et bono, their very 
acknowledgement alone goes far to establish a template—if not a 
construct—for evidencing and applying the transnational standard 
of equity. 
Security, human dignity and well-being, compassion and 
humanism, are values which the courts must—domestically and 
internationally—secure through simply applying equity to judicial 
decision-making, which for purposes of analysis in this Article, 
apply to managing futile medical conditions at the end-stage of life 
in such a manner to assure whatever degree of kindness and 
compassion that can be given under the facts of any given situation. 
IV.  Domestic or National Precedents 
For purposes of this Article, and the issue of end-of-life care, 
the concurrence for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in the 1989 case 
of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, et al,94 is pertinent. 
Holding that the refusal of food and water delivered artificially 
 
 89 United States. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820). 
 90 See supra note 86, for the three types of equity. 
 91 JANIS, supra note 74, at 5–9. 
 92 Netherlands v. Belgium (1937), Judge Hudson’s Opinion, 1937 P.C.I.J. Reports, 
sec. A/B, no. 70, at 73, 76. 
 93 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.2. 
 94 Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287–92 (1990) (O’Connor, J. 
concurring). 
2017 HUMAN DIGNITY AS A NORMATIVE STANDARD 289 
was to be viewed as an act within a protected liberty interest and 
properly refused as unwanted medical treatment, Justice O’Connor 
observed that “our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with 
our idea of physical freedom and self-determination” and—
furthermore—a state that forces “a competent adult to endure such 
procedures against her will burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity, 
and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment.”95  
Stressing the compromise of the “integrity of personhood” by 
forcible intrusions of this nature, the Justice asserted, “the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects 
anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject medical 
treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.”96  The 
very same “minimal conditions necessary for a life in dignity,”97 
then, (e.g., autonomy, respect, self-determination, compassion, 
humaneness, decency) are the very same conditions and values 
which should prevail in the management of the end-stage of life. 
The Cruzan case was pivotal in developing a constitutional 
jurisprudence for end-of-life management.  The notion of a 
recognized liberty interest in dying without refractory pain and 
suffering—both for competent and incompetent patients98—was 
validated by the Cruzan holding.99  As a consequence of this liberty 
interest in dying without pain, with as much dignity as possible, 
when challenges to its exercise are raised, courts would proceed to 
balance this liberty against competing state interests to protect the 
vulnerable (e.g., the aged and infirm, unhealthy).100  State interest in 
preserving a terminally ill person’s life would obviously be weaker 
than preserving life which is not in its terminal phase.101  The Cruzan 
construct for decision making—anchored, as such, in the Common 
Law right to refuse treatment—is a more reasonable approach to 
analysis than validating a fundamental right to die with dignity.102 
 
 95 Id. at 289. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.; see WALTER KÄLIN & JÖRG KÜNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 303 (2004); see also Paust, supra note 10. 
 98 FOLEY, supra note 57, at 185 (stating that while a majority of the Court appeared 
“to assume that a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment survived incompetency”, 
the Rehnquist “official” majority would limit its holding only to competent patients). 
 99 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280–287. 
 100 See FOLEY, supra note 57, at 184–85. 
 101 Id. at 184. 
 102 Id.  
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Were a right to death be recognized as a fundamental right, a 
vexatious dilemma would follow: namely, whether the state would 
be charged, correspondingly, with an equal obligation to both 
bestow, as well as guarantee, a life with dignity?103  “If ensuring 
dignity at death is the government’s responsibility, dignity during 
life is an equal, if not greater, responsibility.”104 
Under circumstances of this nature, it would follow that dignity 
would be denominated an entitlement.105  Although set as a 
responsibility “in the modern, socialistic sense,”106 dignity in life is 
not a precise integral value in the U.S. Constitution.107  It is better to 
view the Constitution as providing negative rights rather than 
affirmative ones.108  Consequently, citizens are granted liberty to 
access—without government power—their individual consciences 
and visions for attaining happiness.109 
The relationship between the U.S. Constitution and death is 
difficult for courts to determine.110  The legislatures are far better 
equipped to enact statutes which draw lines of distinction111 for 
example, between physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia.112 
When presented with issues of physician-assisted suicide and 
the states’ right to prohibit it, the Supreme Court has held in two 
path-breaking cases—Vacco v. Quill113 and Washington v. 
Glucksberg114—that it was valid, constitutionally, to prohibit 
suicide, especially since the idea of physician-assisted suicide was 
neither a part of the Nation’s history nor its traditions;115 and laws 
prohibiting such conduct were not in contravention of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.116 
 
 103 Id. at 183. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 183–84 
 106 FOLEY, supra note 57, at 184. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 184, 199. 
 110 Id. at 180, 184, 199. 
 111 Id. at 199. 
 112 FOLEY, supra note 57, at 177. 
 113 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 114 Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 115 FOLEY, supra note 57, at 177. 
 116 Id.; see also DAVID NAGEL, NEEDLESS SUFFERING: HOW SOCIETY FAILS THOSE 
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In the concurring opinions in both Quill and Glucksberg, Justice 
O’Connor implies that a constitutional liberty may exist, when a 
terminal medical condition is diagnosed, in order to be free from the 
refractory pain experienced from such a condition.117  But she 
intimates that without “great suffering,” there can be no 
constitutional claim.118  In these two cases, there was adequate pain 
relief available legally to the moving parties.119  Accordingly, the 
“liberty” found in the Due Process Clause—which could arguably 
embrace a coordinate liberty to use assistance in an out of suicide, 
motivated solely to avoid a painful and undignified death—was not 
an “operable” fact in these cases.120  There was a direct implication, 
however, in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence that in situations 
where no intractable pain was present and no state legislation was 
in play, a different judicial result might result.121 
Justice John Paul Stevens, in his concurrence in Glucksberg, 
recognizes Justice O’Connor’s notion of a liberty interest as central 
to any action to avoid intolerable pain “and the indignity of living 
one’s final days incapacitated and in agony.”122  When statutory 
mandates are either vague and indeterminate or lacking altogether, 
this formulation should be seen as more judicially palpable than 
seeking precise limits to a “right” to die with dignity.123 
 
WITH CHRONIC PAIN (2016).  See generally George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, 
Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care: Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 
20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469 (2011) (analyzing the extent to which the state should 
act to establish and then implement a human right to avoid refractory pain and existential 
suffering in end-stage illness).  
 117 Id. at 180. 
 118 FOLEY, supra note 57, at 179. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Washington. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 745 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Rubin 
et al., supra note 20. 
 123 See George P. Smith, II, Gently into the Good Night: Toward a Compassionate 
Response to End-Stage Illness, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 475, 488–89 (2013) 
(asserting that the Common Law right to refuse treatment is a more realistic option for 
attaining dignity at death than seeking to establish a constitutional right to die with dignity 
and with assistance).  See generally Final Certainty, ECONOMIST (June 27, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21656122-campaigns-let-doctors-help-
suffering-and-terminally-ill-die-are-gathering-momentum [https://perma.cc/8XBQ-
PENT] (discussing campaigns advocating for the legality of physician assisted suicide). 
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A. Legislative Responses 
Legislatively, five states and the District of Columbia, have 
enacted laws which allow those with a terminal medical condition 
to seek pharmacologic assistance from a physician to end their own 
lives.124  One state supreme court, Montana, concluded that while 
there was no constitutional right to die with dignity in the state, 
physician assistance for those in the end-stage of life was not 
violative of state legislation designed to protect the terminally ill, 
nor was such assistance against state public policy to protect 
vulnerable individuals.125 
Similarly, in parts of Europe—notably, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Switzerland—a legislative right of the terminally ill 
to have assistance in ending their lives has been recognized.126 
 
 124 Colorado End-of-Life Options Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-101 (2016); End of 
Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.1–22. (West 2015); The Oregon 
Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 
§§ 5281–93 (2013); The Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE  § 70.245 




 125 Baxter v. Montana, 354 Mont. 234 (2009). 
 126 See JOHN GRIFFITHS, HELEN WEYERS & MAURICE ADAMS, EUTHANASIA AND LAW 
IN EUROPE (2008); see Attitudes Towards Assisted Dying, ECONOMIST (June 27, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21656121-idea-whose-time-has-come-
attitudes-towards-assisted-dying [https://perma.cc/J4DB-KYE3] (survey of attitudes 
regarding physician assistance from fifteen countries); see also Charles Lane, Where the 




(reporting primarily on a Dutch psychiatric patient known as 2014-77, who at age 10, was 
diagnosed with autism and some 30 years later was euthanized at his request because under 
Dutch law, he suffered from an incurable mental illness); see also Ezekiel J. Emanuel et 
al., Attitudes and Practices of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United 
States, Canada, and Europe,  JAMA 79   (July 5, 2016), 
http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2532018 [https://perma.cc/RP3J-Z4QN] 
(discussing a new study that has found that although euthanasia and physician suicide are 
becoming more accepted legally, their active use is rare and not subject to excessive 
abuse—confined primarily, as such, to patients with cancer).  In Carter v. Canada, the 
Supreme Court of Canada reached a unanimous decision on February 6. 2015, which 
reversed a previous holding prohibiting laws allowing for physician assistance for patients 
in a terminal medical condition.   Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015], 1 S.C.R. 
331 (Can.) (overruling Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SC.R. 
519 (Can.)).  In Carter, the High Court held that any such prohibitions of this nature and 
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V. Fundamental or Competing Human Rights? 
The modern genesis of human rights is to be found in the United 
Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,127 together 
with the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights128 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.129 
By their very nature, human rights are inherent to all individuals 
and not dependent upon the state for either their existence or their 
enjoyment.130  This Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
proclaims this basic principle when it acknowledges, “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”131  The function 
of human rights, then, is to create state obligations, and not to create 
 
the very notion that "grievous and unremediable medical conditions" can exist which—for 
humane and compassionate medical reasons are not subject to relief—not only infringe on 
the right to life, liberty and dignity and security, but are in contravention to fundamental 
principles of justice.  Id. See also Ian Austen, Canada Court Strikes Down Ban on Aiding 
Patient Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/world/americas/supreme-court-of-canada-
overturns-bans-on-doctor-assisted-suicide.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LMT8-NZDJ] 
(discussing that in Carter, the principal case overruling Rodriguez, the High Court held 
that any such prohibitions of this nature and the very notion that “grievous and 
irremediable medical conditions” can exist which—for humane and compassionate 
medical reasons are not subject to relief—not only infringe on the right to life, liberty and 
dignity and security, but are in contravention to fundamental principles of justice).  See 
generally Josh Sanburn, How Canada’s Right-to-Die Ruling Could Boost Movement in 
U.S., TIME (Feb. 6, 2015). http://time.com/3699464,Feb62015 [https://perma.cc/V6MN-
2PTS] (discussing effect the Canada Court’s ruling could have on the United States).  But 
see Scott Y. H., Kim et al., Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide of Patients With Psychiatric 
Disorders in the Netherlands 2011-2014, JAMA PSYCHIATRY (Apr. 2016), 
http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2491354 
[https://perma.cc/5VWV-UVQK] (challenging the notion that an informed judgment can 
ever be given by an emotionally or cognitively impaired person). 
 127 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 128 G.A Res. 2200A (XXI) (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant] (the United States is not a party). 
 129 G.A Res. 2200A (XXI) (Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights Covenant] (the United States is a party, subject to several reservations, 
understandings and declarations).  Collectively, these three dignitarian instruments are 
seen as the “International Bill of Rights”.  JAMES, supra note 40. 
 130 See George P. Smith, II, Human Rights and Bioethics: Formulating a Universal 
Right to Health Care, or Health Protection?, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1295, 1298 
(2005). 
 131 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); 
see also Klaus Dicke, The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, in CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 14, at 111. 
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general ethics.132  Human rights are seen properly as setting not only 
minimum standards for governance but as a means for safeguarding 
against state oppression.133  Indeed, these rights “are at the heart of 
a free and democratic society.”134 
While the Universal Declaration is non-binding, significant 
parts have attained the status of binding—rules of customary 
international law or—alternatively—are acknowledge as part of 
those general principles of law subscribed to by civilized nations.135  
It has been said, in fact, that the enumerated rights set forth within 
the Declaration are “made whole by dignity.”136  In and of 
themselves, the principles enumerated within the Declaration are 
not human rights.  Respect for human dignity is the catalyst for a 
human rights policy whenever freedom and equality are 
jeopardized.137 
A. Human Rights and the Rights of Man 
The provenance of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is to be found within the ideas and philosophies of the 18th century 
Enlightenment, the American and French revolutions, together with 
the movement toward democracy and of liberalism.138  “On the 
surface, they reflect the democratization and universalization of 
values and norms which have always been held as a supreme, 
existential importance by men, tribes, nations, the world over and 
by the ruling classes at least in the West.”139  Central to the notion 
 
 132 See Adam McBeth, Privatising Human Rights: What Happens to the State’s 
Human Rights Duties When Services are Privatized?, 5 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 133, 143 (2004). 
 133 Id.  Today, many human rights no longer limit state powers, alone, but have been 
privatized.  HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO (2007). 
 134 Gerard Brennan, Foreword to CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCEMENT IN A 
FROZEN CONTINENT, at viii (H. P. Lee & P. Gerangelos eds., 2009). 
 135 THERESE MURPHY, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (2013). 
 136 Id. at 17. 
 137 Dicke, The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 14, at 111. 
 138 Yehoshua Arieli, On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence 
of the Doctrine of The Dignity of Man and His Rights, in CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, 
supra note 14, at 5.  See generally Seth Mohney, The Great Power Origins of Human 
Rights, 35 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 828 (2014) (tracking some of the history of human rights). 
 139 Hubert Canick, Dignity Of Man’ And Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some 
Remarks On Cicero, De Officiis I 105–07, in CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 14, 
at 27; Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, in CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 14, at 133. 
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of citizenship, for the Greeks through the ideal of the Politeia and 
by the Romans in the civis romanus, were the core values of liberty, 
dignity and self-determination;140 just as in the same fashion that it 
was asserted by European societies, the nobility, and the Buerger.141 
The theory of the “Rights of Man” was, then, drawn from past 
beliefs, as well as traditions and experiences by the intellectual 
leaders of the West.142  In fact, this bold contention was the basis for 
proclaiming the inalienable rights of citizens in the U.S. Declaration 
of Independence143 and, largely, the American national identity144 
and value system.145 
Recognized, since the end of World War II, as not only legal 
norms but also as legitimate criteria for not only asserting, 
establishing and maintaining political legitimacy, human rights 
have now achieved such a universal pre-eminence that a modern 
state is seen as neither legitimate nor complete without an 
accounting of a human rights record.146 
Human dignity, quite simply, then, goes to the very heart of 
what being a person embraces in a value system.  Yet, as a theorized 
concept, dignity has often been seen—as observed—as 
“incomplete;” because, to be an adequate normative account, it 
lacks a “well-specified counterpart obligation.”147  Even with a 
“charge” of incompleteness, a fundamental assertion may be made: 
namely, that there is an overlapping, consensus which exists 
regarding the value which underlie the acceptance of dignity as a 
human right where worth must be secured and protected by the 
states.148 
 
 140 Arieli, supra note 138, at 5. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id.  
 144 Weisstub, supra note 52, at 263. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Eric Heinze, Even-Handedness and The Politics of Human Rights, 21 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 7, 7 (2008).  See generally Carrie Booth Walling, Human Rights Norms, State 
Sovereignty, and Humanitarian Interventions, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 383 (2015) (analyzing the 
changing meanings of state sovereignty to legitimize and protect human rights norms). 
 147 JOHN TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2012). 
 148 Id. at 375; see also JONATHAN HERRING, CARING AND THE LAW, 88–151 (2013) 
(stressing the obligation of the state to support care and promote Social Justice); George 
P. Smith, II, Social Justice and Health Care Management: An Elusive Quest?, 9 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2008). 
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Over succeeding years, as in the past, the focus of the “human 
rights debate” will be the extent to which economic, social, and 
cultural rights are as cognizable and equal as civil and political 
rights.149  Arguments will seek to either prioritize rights—placing 
differing moral rights on them—or, alternatively, asserting that 
fundamental rights cannot be ranked, but must be equally 
honored.150  The perception of the inferiority of economic, social 
and cultural rights to civil and political rights raises a serious 
concern that endowing such rights with “human rights status” would 
have the end result of “weakening traditional human rights” and 
thus play into the notion that allowing violations of economic, 
social, and cultural rights is justifiable.151  
“A common ground of moral understanding” must be reached 
before minimum standards of behavior can be negotiated and, 
ideally, morphed by all states into a standard of universality for the 
uniform application of human rights.152  Once a basic acceptance of 
“performance” standards is attained, adjustments can be allowed—
tied as such to differing legal, moral and cultural value systems 
within each state.153  Yet, even with the attainment of this ideal 
model scenario, where by treaty, acquiesce, or custom, states rise to 
a “universal” acceptance and enforcement of human rights, one 
overpowering geopolitical policy consideration must be 
understood: namely, that the core determinants of the level of 
respect, protection and enforcement of those rights is tied, 
unalterably, to the level of economic development and self-
sufficiency of each state.154 
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B. Subsidiarity and The Law of International Human Rights 
As a structural principle of international human rights law and 
as an ideal, subsidiarity is quite directly a model of social 
organization.155  It became a part of the political lexicon in the 
twentieth century, but traces its provenance to classical Greece.156 
The efficacy of subsidiarity is not found from it as being a force 
for social efficiency or even as a template for political compromise. 
Rather, its etiology is “personalistic rather than contractual or 
utilitarian.”157  At bottom, subsidiarity—then—is to be 
acknowledged as “a conviction that each human individual is 
endowed with an inherent and inalienable worth, or dignity, and 
thus that the value of the individual human person is ontologically 
and morally prior to the state or other social groupings.”158 
Both subsidiarity and human rights seek to advance and to 
secure the common dignity of the human person.159  Noble though 
the principle of subsidiarity is, in reality, procedures for 
safeguarding its implementation through human rights guarantees 
and protections remain illusionary—this, because the law of human 
rights, itself, is subject to long-standing incoherence and 
inconsistencies.160  The instability of subsidiarity may be understood 
further when law is accepted as being more than a “system of rules” 
set within one “normative universe” and instead seen correctly as 
being comprised of plural communities which have countless 
“narratives that locate [law] and give it meaning” within those 
communities.161 
Norms—and, here dignity—develop from behaviorism162 
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which, in turn, focuses on those social conditions which either 
enable or disable various life actions.  Normative environments 
must—of necessity—be seen as being composed of economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political actions or vectors of force.163 
International human rights treaties which endeavor to structure 
regulatory regimes are generally ineffective because they ignore the 
realities of individual state behavioralism and seek to have human 
rights enforced by treaty and/or universal declarations.164  Since 
there is no central enforcement mechanism for violations of human 
rights, the whole corpus of international human rights law must be 
acknowledged as “hopelessly weak” because of this failure.165  
Ultimately, whether state actions comply with a particular treaty or 
allow a state to first recognize, and then endeavor to realize, 
provisions of universal declarations, depend upon the social 
conditions within each state.166 
It is encouraging to observe that over the last decade, the 
justiciability of economic, social, and cultural rights has been 
evolving.167  The effect of this recognition for human rights is that 
they are now open to interpretation by judicial or quasi-judicial 
bodies and, furthermore, determinations may be made regarding the 
sufficiency of a complaint before these bodies for violations of these 
rights.168 
C.  Advancing a Global Framework for a New 
Constitutionalism? 
Pivotal to a global initiative to structure a framework for 
advancing a new human rights constitutionalism169 are three 
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instruments: the Universal Declaration on Human Genome and 
Human Rights170 of 1998, the 2003 International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data,171 and the Universal Bioethics Declaration of 
2005.172  In addition to these Declarations, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,173 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,174 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)175 collectively set forth 
working principles and impose obligations that bear a direct 
relationship to normative medical ethics.176 
Human rights, bioethics and medical ethics are inextricably 
linked together by provisions in these United Nations Declarations, 
which require respect for human dignity and equality, the right to 
life, and the realization of a standard of living.177  These provisions 
also promote health and assure medical care along with the right to 
be free from inhumane and degrading treatment.178 
UNESCO’s member states adopted the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights on October 19, 2005.179  The 
Declaration in Article 14 enunciates a Principle of Social 
Responsibility which directs decisions and practices in science and 
technology to advance the human good by providing “access to 
adequate nutrition and water,” “eliminat[ing] . . . the 
marginali[z]ation and exclusion of persons,” and “reduc[ing] of 
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poverty and illiteracy.”180  Article 14 strengthens the very notion of 
social responsibility by directing the benefits of scientific research 
to advance, among other interests, “access to quality health care” 
and support for health services.181 
Article 23 of the Bioethics and Human Rights Declaration 
underscores state responsibilities to safeguard public health 
standards by using proportionate measures designed to not only 
accord respect for ‘human dignity, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ be undertaken pro-actively when “threats of serious 
irreversible damage to public health or human welfare” exist.182  The 
Declaration can be properly seen, then, as a creative effort to 
recognize, and thus validate, an inextricable symbiotic relationship 
between human dignity and human rights with “access” to health 
care.  Indeed, in this regard, if not accepted as an independent 
human right, dignity must be accepted as, at a minimum, an integral 
part of the human right to health care.183 
In spite of its limited ratification and marginal impact, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine should 
nonetheless be recognized as a creative illustration of how bioethics, 
medical ethics and the norms of international human rights can 
operate together.184  This linkage is created through policies 
regulating equitable access to healthcare and informed consent, 
along with restrictions on the uses of the human genome and other 
regulations on scientific research.185 
Although all of these UN conventions and declarations are 
influential in structuring an international policy framework in this 
new age of biotechnology, their permanence and effectiveness are 
hindered by the fact that principles, covenants, statutes, protocols, 
declarations and conventions bind only states which either accede 
or ratify them.186 
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Progressivity standards shape political efforts to design and then 
enforce a right to health as either a social, political, or a cultural 
right.187  This fragile—if not fatally flawed—enforcement 
mechanism immunizes all states from human rights violations so 
long as they present evidence of their progressive (or at least 
measurable) actions toward the realization of human rights.188 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights acts as 
a strong counter influence to mediate the Standard of 
Progressivity’s negative impact realizing human rights.189  As part 
of an action plan for promoting and realizing human rights, the 
Committee has held that core minimum obligations must be 
satisfied by all state parties who have ratified the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, “[e]ven where non-compliance is excused” 
under the standards of progressivity.190 
In the final analysis and application, economic self-interest and 
political survival determine the level of both the recognition and the 
enforcement of health-care protections and the extent to which they 
are accepted or rejected as an integral part of social, cultural, 
political or human rights.  A strong civil society, operating freely, 
is essential in order to secure sustainable human rights nationally.191 
VI. Conclusion 
As a concept, principle, normative standard, or value, human 
dignity may be viewed correctly as predating human rights—this, 
because human rights are, in contemporary society, seen as 
“juridical concretization” of but a generalized notion of human 
dignity.192  Owing to the capacious nature of human rights, clarity 
of application or human dignity as a normative standard is 
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understandably elusive.  Indeed, attempting to define limits to 
dignity is especially perplexing since respecting dignity not only 
implies respect for individual autonomy but “the right of everyone 
not to be devalued as a human being in a degrading or humiliating 
manner.”193 
Standing alone, the virtue of dignity should be not 
acknowledged as a single and distinct as, for example, courage.  
Rather, dignity should be understood as “a collection of loosely 
related traits like self-respect, self-control, and self-discipline.”194  
The very taxonomy of human dignity, then, is set with a “context of 
respect for persons and the value of autonomy”.195 
All of the international instruments on human rights, at one level 
or other, have human dignity as their “first and last resort”.196  
Consequently, the optimum value of maximizing human dignity is 
codified, then, when laws and policies administering justice are 
guided by the central, modern virtue of human dignity.197  If human 
dignity is acknowledged as the ultimate value, or even as a 
foundational value, it assumes the function of a social ideal.198 
Therefore, it has been suggested that because of the ambiguities 
in definition and application, the essential worth of human dignity 
as a concept is “limited,”199 problematic and open to question in 
reality.200  If not applied as a catalyst for normative conduct, human 
dignity must nonetheless be evaluated and applied as a “common 
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ground for moral understanding”,201 a tool for consensus morality,202 
or, at a minimum, a template for safeguarding international 
equity.203 
It is important to remember that the very ends of medicine are 
devoted to preserving human dignity and preventing 
“dehumanization.”204  It remains for the physician to recognize a 
duty of beneficence to safeguard the patient from losing dignity and 
thereby despairing.205  The physician must also be ever mindful that 
(independent of bodily pain) extreme abasement and humiliation, 
loss of hope, and demoralization may result in acute emotional pain 
which must be dealt with appropriately.206 
At the end-stage of life, health care management decision-
making should be guided by situational ethics, which are shaped not 
only by common sense, but also by beneficence, compassion and 
love,207 thus seeking to assure dignity in dying.  Consistent with the 
principle of medical futility, physicians should be emboldened to 
take reasonable and sound professional measures to alleviate pain 
and existential suffering.208  When deemed appropriate to a 
particular case and consistent with patient values and life 
experiences, deep or palliative sedation should, for example, be seen 
as not only efficacious, but also compassionate care that preserves 
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human dignity.209 
Ideally, the importance of preserving human dignity at the end-
of-life stage should be recognized as a human right.210  Imprecise as 
the term is and conditioned, as such, by economic, cultural, social 
and political forces with each member state of the United Nations,211 
having human dignity nonetheless codified in international policy 
documents is significant.212  Although admittedly symbolic, the 
importance of human dignity alternatively, as a normative catalyst 
for on-going dialogue and for implementation in action programs 
for the attainment and safeguarding of human rights by the United 
Nations ECOSOC and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights cannot be overstated.  The eloquent words of the 
Preamble to the UN Charter, which came into force in 1945, remain 
a clarion call to establish and secure “the dignity and the worth of 
the human person”213 by recognizing the right to die with dignity as 
an inviolable human right—for, the right to dignity reflects, most 
appropriately, more than any other right can or does, the very 
essence of what being a human being means.214  Dignity should be 
viewed rightly as nothing less than “an expression of the unity of 
mankind.”215 
Planning end-of-life management decisions or death induction 
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plans within the framework of human rights protections, is as 
important for individuals as it is for the democratic society in which 
they live.  The reason for this linkage is that these decisions are 
simply seen as “important for both the individual and the democratic 
society in which he or she lives.”216  Even though no right to die is 
recognized domestically and internationally, the very “right to life 
not only as a civil and political right but also as a part of economic, 
social and cultural rights plays a major role in safeguarding human 
existence.”217  In the final analysis, “the fundamental questions in 
law and ethics will be shaped by what we think it means to be human 
and what we understand to be the ethical obligations owed to the 
human person”,218 as well as whether human dignity can be realized 
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